regional head of SIS, Colonel Leo Steveni, during the period 1942-44. His unduly close relationship with the Indian Army and GHQ India led to pressure to deploy SIS in and just behind the battle area for the purpose of operational, even tactical, intelligence. This was a perverse development given that the traditional role of SIS was, in fact, long-range political, economic and strategic intelligence. The willingness of SIS to subordinate itself to local demands proved to be a serious mistake. Yet the pressures of local commanders in Asia were fierce and unrelenting and those organizations that did not respond risked being eclipsed by one of the many other rival clandestine services. SIS in wartime Asia was thus beleaguered by two separate types of difficulties. Firstly, operational problems that were unique to that part of the world. Secondly, managerial problems mostly related to the complexities of an organization responsible to its 'Head Office' in London, yet working in co-operation within regional or 'theatre' commands. These bureaucratic problems were widespread during the Second World War, but they were exacerbated by the distance between London and the centres of command in Asia. regional head of SIS, Colonel Leo Steveni, during the period 1942-44. His unduly close relationship with the Indian Army and GHQ India led to pressure to deploy SIS in and just behind the battle area for the purpose of operational, even tactical, intelligence. This was a perverse development given that the traditional role of SIS was, in fact, long-range political, economic and strategic intelligence. The willingness of SIS to subordinate itself to local demands proved to be a serious mistake. Yet the pressures of local commanders in Asia were fierce and unrelenting and those organizations that did not respond risked being eclipsed by one of the many other rival clandestine services. SIS in wartime Asia was thus beleaguered by two separate types of difficulties. Firstly, operational problems that were unique to that part of the world. Secondly, managerial problems mostly related to the complexities of an organization responsible to its 'Head Office' in London, yet working in co-operation within regional or 'theatre' commands. These bureaucratic problems were widespread during the Second World War, but they were exacerbated by the distance between London and the centres of command in Asia. As a result, by 1945, SIS in Asia had deteriorated badly and was only saved from de facto extinction by the intervention of Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, the Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia, and his far-sighted clandestine operations supremo, Captain G. A. Garnons-Williams, RN. Their decision was a radical one. They urged the withdrawal of SIS from the war againstJapan altogether, suggesting that it concentrate resources on developing long-range projects focused on the post-war period, and to which SIS was temperamentally more suited.'3
The generally dismal nature of British intelligence provision in Europe during the inter-war years has already been explored to a figure. He enjoyed wearing exotic non-regulation uniforms and had developed a unique surreptitious walk that lent an air of subterfuge to everything that he did. As a result his cover was non-existent.16 As early as December 1933 the American Military Attache in Shanghai, Lieutenant Colonel Drysdale, had confidently identified Steptoe as the 'British intelligence agent'. This was partly because his name did not appear in the list of his own consulate's personnel and also because of his peculiar activities which led Drysdale to think that he was on some sort of secretive 'roving commission'.17
Predictably, the intelligence gathered by SIS at Shanghai was meagre. A few Chinese dock-labourers were utilized as coastwatchers in Japan. But reliable Chinese agents were elusive. In China they found it increasingly hard to travel freely in what was now a war zone. The Yangste River had been closed to traffic and informers watching the progress of the Sino-Japanese War had to travel slowly by land routes. Accordingly, the information that SIS managed to pick up from the missionaries and traders who worked for them was invariably out of date. Soviet Asia also presented an awkward target. Although there were plenty of White Russian exiles in Shanghai, penetrating into Soviet Siberia was all but impossible and two SIS agents were already on trial there. Wigglesworth noted: 'There are not many Russians who are prepared to enter Siberia when they know that suspicion means "liquidation" '.8 In mainland Southeast Asia, an area of growing strategic importance, there was no permanent British intelligence representation of any kind. Even during 1940, with Japan extending her presence into French Indochina, SIS did not see fit to station officers there, nor 16 I am dependent on private information for insight into some of Steptoe's more colourful attributes. One of Steptoe's more notorious SIS colleagues offers a similarly low opinion of him: 'The near-mental case was Steptoe of Shanghai, who had covered the whole Far East for SIS between the wars. How it happened was still a mystery to me: I found it difficult to believe that he could hold any job for a week. figure. He enjoyed wearing exotic non-regulation uniforms and had developed a unique surreptitious walk that lent an air of subterfuge to everything that he did. As a result his cover was non-existent.16 As early as December 1933 the American Military Attache in Shanghai, Lieutenant Colonel Drysdale, had confidently identified Steptoe as the 'British intelligence agent'. This was partly because his name did not appear in the list of his own consulate's personnel and also because of his peculiar activities which led Drysdale to think that he was on some sort of secretive 'roving commission'.17
Predictably, the intelligence gathered by SIS at Shanghai was meagre. A few Chinese dock-labourers were utilized as coastwatchers in Japan. But reliable Chinese agents were elusive. In China they found it increasingly hard to travel freely in what was now a war zone. The Yangste River had been closed to traffic and informers watching the progress of the Sino-Japanese War had to travel slowly by land routes. Accordingly, the information that SIS managed to pick up from the missionaries and traders who worked for them was invariably out of date. Soviet Asia also presented an awkward target. Although there were plenty of White Russian exiles in Shanghai, penetrating into Soviet Siberia was all but impossible and two SIS agents were already on trial there. Wigglesworth noted: 'There are not many Russians who are prepared to enter Siberia when they know that suspicion means "liquidation" '.8 In mainland Southeast Asia, an area of growing strategic importance, there was no permanent British intelligence representation of any kind. Even during 1940, with Japan extending her presence into French Indochina, SIS did not see fit to station officers there, nor were there any permanent service attaches. The latter function was fulfilled by overworked staff officers from Singapore who occasionally undertook tours through Bangkok, Saigon and Hanoi. This was in contrast to the Japanese embassies and consulates, where the number of service attaches was growing fast.19 Nevertheless, British diplomats in the region were not entirely devoid of secret information, for on some issues they could turn to the powerful private clandestine apparatus run by large firms in the area such as Armstrong Vickers and also Asiatic Petroleum, the local subsidiary of Royal Dutch-Shell. In December 1938, SirJosiah Crosby, the British Minister in Bangkok, explained to his superiors in London that the intelligence service of the local branch of the Asiatic Petroleum Company is such an efficient one, there is no information which I can myself usefully impart ... It is they, indeed, who keep the [British] Legation up to date and to whom I myself have to resort for what is afoot.
Nevertheless, British officials were unhappy about their dependency on companies who might carefully select the material that they decided to pass to the authorities. 20 Both before and during the Second World War the majority of British secret information in Asia came not from agents but from intercepting and decyphering signals communications. Prior to 1939 the main British intercept station was at Stonecutters Island in Hong Kong Harbour. Wigglesworth toured these facilities in 1938 and, given the extraordinary value of intercept operations, he was stunned by the physical dilapidation at Stonecutters Island. The accommodation in the intercept building was totally inadequate: 'even a washing place is being used as an operating room'. Personnel were being worked literally round the clock. One operative complained to him that, since arriving three years ago, he had not enjoyed a single weekend of leave. This paucity of staff meant that while Japanese high policy material was decrypted immediately, operational material backed up and all tactical intelligence was simply discarded. The lack of physical security at the station was also quite remarkable and Kong Harbour. Wigglesworth toured these facilities in 1938 and, given the extraordinary value of intercept operations, he was stunned by the physical dilapidation at Stonecutters Island. The accommodation in the intercept building was totally inadequate: 'even a washing place is being used as an operating room'. Personnel were being worked literally round the clock. One operative complained to him that, since arriving three years ago, he had not enjoyed a single weekend of leave. This paucity of staff meant that while Japanese high policy material was decrypted immediately, operational material backed up and all tactical intelligence was simply discarded. The lack of physical security at the station was also quite remarkable and Kong Harbour. Wigglesworth toured these facilities in 1938 and, given the extraordinary value of intercept operations, he was stunned by the physical dilapidation at Stonecutters Island. The accommodation in the intercept building was totally inadequate: 'even a washing place is being used as an operating room'. Personnel were being worked literally round the clock. One operative complained to him that, since arriving three years ago, he had not enjoyed a single weekend of leave. This paucity of staff meant that while Japanese high policy material was decrypted immediately, operational material backed up and all tactical intelligence was simply discarded. The lack of physical security at the station was also quite remarkable and organizations based in London and took full account of the situation on the ground in Burma. As a short-term measure all operational intelligence would now go direct to forward headquarters, including that of Slim's 14th Army, without any SIS collation or analysis. In future, P Division would allocate whatever clandestine service was best placed to collect intelligence in each area, regardless of its formal role. In the long-term, SEAC would seek to absorb all operational intelligence gathering under the control of one service in Burma. This was likely to be SOE who would also absorb local army reconnaissance groups like 'Z' Force and 'V' Force. Moreover, in Burma, operational intelligence, not sabotage, would now be SOE's first priority until Mountbatten told them otherwise.
The proposals put forward by Garnons-Williams were certainly radical. They suited Slim's 14th Army in Burma, but they cut across the accepted functional divisions between different secret services as agreed in London. Accordingly, Garnons-Williams warned that all this would have to be cleared a second time with Menzies in London 'as it involves British S.I.S. policy'.6' SIS had no more trouble from Slim and the 14th Army, for two months later the curious decision was taken to remove him as commander. Nevertheless SIS were now in a tight corner. From the start of the war they had taken a wrong turning and concentrated on operational intelligence in Burma, an area in which SOE had quickly overtaken them.62 Slim had articulated a wider problem that would not go away and his demands had acted as a catalyst. After Barrackpore, an increasingly confident SOE tried to establish control over all operational intelligence gathering by agents throughout Mountbatten's command. organizations based in London and took full account of the situation on the ground in Burma. As a short-term measure all operational intelligence would now go direct to forward headquarters, including that of Slim's 14th Army, without any SIS collation or analysis. In future, P Division would allocate whatever clandestine service was best placed to collect intelligence in each area, regardless of its formal role. In the long-term, SEAC would seek to absorb all operational intelligence gathering under the control of one service in Burma. This was likely to be SOE who would also absorb local army reconnaissance groups like 'Z' Force and 'V' Force. Moreover, in Burma, operational intelligence, not sabotage, would now be SOE's first priority until Mountbatten told them otherwise.
The proposals put forward by Garnons-Williams were certainly radical. They suited Slim's 14th Army in Burma, but they cut across the accepted functional divisions between different secret services as agreed in London. Accordingly, Garnons-Williams warned that all this would have to be cleared a second time with Menzies in London 'as it involves British S.I.S. policy'.6' SIS had no more trouble from Slim and the 14th Army, for two months later the curious decision was taken to remove him as commander. Nevertheless SIS were now in a tight corner. From the start of the war they had taken a wrong turning and concentrated on operational intelligence in Burma, an area in which SOE had quickly overtaken them.62 Slim had articulated a wider problem that would not go away and his demands had acted as a catalyst. After Barrackpore, an increasingly confident SOE tried to establish control over all operational intelligence gathering by agents throughout Mountbatten's command. Mergui, an island off the coast of southern Burma, from where they were to report on shipping and Japanese movements by radio. This part of the operation was successful, but they were soon embarrassed by an encounter with five of the local indigenous population whom they captured to maintain the security of their position. In the words of the report: 'They were presented with the alternative of bumping them off or having them taken away by aircraft.' The BARNOWL party explained their predicament by radio and senior SIS officers approached the RAF with a view to mounting some sort of extraction. The RAF were impressed by their arguments noting 'we should make every effort to save this ISLD [SIS] party from the extremely unpleasant duty of committing murder in cold blood' and agreed to send in a Catalina aircraft. They also noted the additional practical argument that these were 'five valuable prisoners' worthy of interrogation at the very least. But at this point radio contact with the party was lost. Attempts were made to conduct air reconnaissance but bad weather prevented any further progress. There is no further record regarding the fate of the BARNOWL party who were presumed captured or killed.63 The major problem then was simply an operational one: SIS was at a significant disadvantage compared to SOE with its powerful resistance organizations on the ground. 
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